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1 Introduction
It is often stated that physicists are concerned with producing a “Theory
of Everything”. However, it is clear that we shall never probe all possible
interactions at all possible energies. By our very nature we are limited to
exploring a very special part of superspace, where spacetime behaves nice and
classically, and where matter is distributed in a very orderly way. Indeed we
benefit greatly from these special properties and (at least to some extent)
could not survive without them. To what extent can our limited set of
observations be used to pin down the specifics of a “Theory of Everything”?
In the limit where the links are arbitrarily tenuous, a “Theory of Everything”
might become a “Theory of Anything”. A clear understanding of what we
can and can not expect to learn about the universe is particularly important
in the field of particle cosmology. The aim of this article is to draw attention
to some key issues which arise in this context, in the hopes of fostering further
discussion.
In Sect. 2 I explore the features of our own observations with suggest
that a “Theory of Anything” might be the best we could hope for. I give
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particular emphasis to the “choice of clock” issue which seems to have been
under-emphasized in this context.
In Sect. 3 I discuss the important role played by posing conditional
probability questions when dealing with probability distributions rather than
idealized points in classical phase space. I emphasize the need to stay as far
away from “anthropic” arguments as possible, but point out that quantum
mechanics guarantees that we can never achieve the idealized classical view.
Section 4 explores possible implications of these ideas on inflationary cos-
mology. The idea that a variety of different inflaton potentials may contribute
to worlds “like ours” might give a physical measure of what is “natural” for
an inflation potential which is quite different than those previously used. I
speculate on a possible outcome of this line of reasoning which is particularly
interesting, and which removes some of the least attractive features of the
inflationary cosmology.
Section 5 gives my conclusions.
2 The inaccessability of a “Theory of Every-
thing”
Suppose there really is a “Theory of Everything” (TOE) which accurately
describes nature at the most fundamental level. Would we be able to tell that
this was the case based on accessible experiments? Here are some arguments
which suggest that specific tests of such a theory would elude us.
2.1 Multiple Vacua
Many candidates for the TOE (for example superstring theory) have more
than one stable (or ultra long-lived) vacuum state. Many of these states
have different symmetries, or even different spacetime dimensions compared
with the universe we observe. The non-commutivity of variables and their
conjugate momenta ensure that no quantum state can represent a single
point in classical phase space, and thus non-zero probabilities are assigned
to a range of possible states Any cosmological history (starting with the high
energies and densities of the big bang) would certainly assign non-trivial
probabilities to the alternative vacua. Our observations would necessarily be
limited to “small” excitations around a single vacuum state. Thus from our
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point of view the TOE would not predict the laws of physics we observe, but
simply tell us that the laws we observe were chosen from a wide range of
possibilities.
2.2 Renormalization of Couplings
One interesting point which has come up in the context of wormhole physics
is that fluctuations in the gravitational field may renormalize the coupling
constants relevant to processes we observe. In many cases the result is a con-
tinuum of non-interacting superselection sectors, each with different values
for the low-energy couplings[1]. Again, the consequence is that the physi-
cal laws we observe are not specified by the TOE, but chosen from many
possibilities.
2.3 Choice of Clock
The next two subsections are a bit outside the main flow of this article. The
discussion is somewhat more technical, and I am taking the opportunity to
give wider publicity to what I feel is an important ambiguity which arises in
quantum cosmology. The reader who is willing to simply accept the premise
that a TOE can leave a great deal of ambiguity regarding the physical laws
we actually observe may wish to skip the next two subsections.
In a time reparameterization invariant theory, (such as a relativistic point
particle or general relativity) the starting point for the quantum theory is a
superspace with no time defined. A particular degree of freedom (or subsys-
tem) is then assigned the role of a clock, and the evolution of the rest of the
physical world as a function of time is then evaluated by inspecting the cor-
relations between the clock subsystem and the rest of the world. (Although
such a construction may seem peculiar to physicists who are used to treating
time as some external parameter, the procedure just described gives a good
operational definition of time as it is actually used in a laboratory.)
To sketch this construction consider a superspace S, with a measure de-
fined so that given a state |ψ〉S in S assigns the probability |S〈ψ|X〉S|
2 to
state |X〉S|
2. Consider a clock subsystem C defined by the partition
S = C ⊗R (1)
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with R representing the “rest” of the superspace. Part of the construction
involves defining the special basis for the C subspace which gives the time
eigenstates of the clock. I denote this basis
{|ti〉C} . (2)
I have no qualms about labeling time (or anything else usually described by a
continuous variable) using a discrete index (such as the index i labeling clock
eigenstates in Eq 2). The difference between a continuum and an arbitrarily
closely spaced discrete label can not possibly be physically observable.
A basis {|j〉R} spanning the R space can also be chosen, and together
with the clock basis a tensor product basis spanning S can be constructed.
Thus a state |ψ〉S in superspace can be written
|ψ〉S =
∑
ij
αij |ti〉C |j〉R . (3)
Defining
|φi〉R ≡
∑
j
αij |j〉R (4)
gives
|ψ〉S =
∑
i
|ti〉C |φi〉R . (5)
The state |ψ(ti)〉R of subsystem R at time ti is determined by conditioning
(projecting) on clock state |ti〉C , giving
|ψ(ti)〉R = |φi〉R . (6)
Equation 5 tells us that “when the clock is in state |ti〉C the R subsystem is
in state |φi〉R (with unit probability)”.
The physics of this system is contained entirely in the αij ’s. From these
one can deduce the initial state |ψ(t0)〉R and the subsequent time evolution
|ψ(ti)〉R. A different initial state evolving in a different manner would corre-
spond to a different set of αij’s.
However, a different set of αij’s just corresponds to a different choice of
clock. To see this, construct a unique integer label k(i, j) for each pair i, j.
One can then write
|k〉S ≡ |i(k)〉C |j(k)〉R (7)
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and
|ψ〉S =
∑
k
αk |k〉S . (8)
If one expands |ψ〉S in a different basis |k
′〉S one will get a different set of
expansion coefficients α˜k′. If one then identifies elements of this new basis
with tensor product states labeled by i′(k′) and j′(k′) one gets
|ψ〉S =
∑
i′j′
α˜k′(i′,j′) |i
′〉C′ |j
′〉R′ . (9)
Note that this amounts to the construction of a new partition S = C ′ ⊗ R′
which in general will have nothing to do with S = C ⊗R.
Since bases can be chosen for S which results in arbitrary α˜k′’s, partitions
of the form S = C ′ ⊗R′ can be constructed which correspond to all possible
α˜i′j′’s. Thus, starting with |ψ〉S one can produce all possible states evolving
according to all possible time evolutions simply by choosing a suitable clock.
2.4 Choice of Clocks: Further Discussion
A random choice of αij’s will generally not give a sensible time evolution. In
the general case |ψ(ti)〉R and |ψ(ti+1)〉R will not be related to one another by
a simple Schro¨dinger equation. (Or, putting it another way, the Hamiltonian
will have some totally random time dependence.) Thus most partitions of S
into C ⊗R will not identify good clock subsystems.
One of the important features of our universe is that there are many
subsystems which can serve equally well as clocks (which is why there can
be such a thing as a clock factory, for example). That means that if one
sets up a theory which accurately describes our world, there is large class of
partitions S = C ⊗ R which simply correspond to switching from one clock
to another, all of which are essentially describing the same initial conditions
with the same time evolution. This fact does not conflict with the statement
that there are other choices of the Clock ⊗Rest partition which correspond
to something totally different.
Where does the Wheeler DeWitt equation fit into my discussion? Under
certain circumstances the the Hilbert space can be further partitioned into
fields representing matter and gravitational degrees of freedom. If the whole
system obeys Einstein gravity, one of the required constraint equations is the
Wheeler DeWitt equation. Since any physical system (and many unphysical
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ones!) can be described by a suitable choice of partition S = C⊗R, some will
obey a suitable Wheeler DeWitt equation and many will not. Of those that
do, all sorts of boundary conditions might be satisfied, and the boundary
conditions would not be uniquely specified by |ψ〉S.
The “problem of time” has been studied a great deal in the context of
quantum gravity[2, 3]. (See for example [4, 5, 6] for work closely related to
this article.) My discussion embraces the “Page-Wooters” (PW) picture of
time. The ambiguity in the dynamics which I discuss here has already been
noted in some specific contexts.
There are several canonical criticisms which are leveled at the sort of
construction I have used here, and in particular, at PW time. Here I give
my response to each:
1. Criticism: PW does not give a good definition of time because PW
time is not defined in the absence of subsystems which behave like good
classical clocks.
Response: I am quite happy to let time be a derived notion which
has no meaning in the absence of classical clocks.
2. Criticism: Defining probability for arbitrary states in superspace (as
I have) leads to normalization problems. The infinite extent of time
must correspond to an undboundedness of superspace, making states
in superspace non-normalizable.
Response: Since I take time to be a derived notion, which only makes
sense in the presence of classical clocks, I view the idea that time is
infinite with suspicion. Even a very open universe will have some prob-
ability of experiencing a quantum fluctuation which closes it, causing
classical time to have finite extent.
3. Criticism: Kucharˇ [3] claims that one cannot construct a two-time
correlation function in the PW picture.
Response: Two time correlation functions can be constructed if care
is taken to make an “operational” construction which follows a realistic
laboratory procedure as closely as possible. The key here is to compare
records of observations made at different times rather than trying to
project the poor clock on two different eigenstates (which of course
gives zero).
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One possible interpretation of the result form the previous subsection is
that no matter how carefully one wishes to construct one’s theory of the world
out of only the known physics, the theory is bound to have vast ambiguities.
Even if one constructs a wavefunction describing only what we know about
the world, evolving according to the observed laws of physics, there will be
other partitions which describe something completely different.
The problem seems to be that the picture of a state developing in time is
so far removed from a “state in superspace” that the two seem to have very
little to do with one another. If a state developing in time can be interpreted
as a state in superspace, than it can be interpreted as just about anything.
Another possible interpretation of the above is that I am being too loose
in the way I go over to the “state in superspace”. For one, I am assuming
that there is an inner product defined on S which allows me to perform all
the manipulations required to go from one partition to another (for example,
changing basis from {|k〉S} to {|k
′〉S}). The ambiguities I mention here
may be reason enough to avoid defining such a general inner product on S.
On the other hand, just constructing a theory of the universe in the most
conservative manner may already implicitly define a measure on S which is
suitable for all the above manipulations.
I hope the analysis presented above will form the basis for further discus-
sions. There are issues at stake which have a great impact on how one tries
to make sense of a quantum theory of the universe.
3 Conditional Probabilities
3.1 General Remarks
In the previous section I argued that processes with which we observe the
world are so “superficial” relative to a TOE that uniquely specifying a TOE
may impose very little constraint on the actual dynamics we observe. (Of
course that raises the question of what is actually superficial, our observations
or the TOE!)
The situation in which a theory presents the scientist with a set of possi-
ble alternatives (rather than a unique prediction) is not unusual in physics.
A mundane example is a slowly cooled ferromagnet (in the absence of macro-
scopic magnetic fields). No prediction can be made of the final direction of
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the magnetization. None the less, a lot can be predicted about this system.
In particular at late times one can predict that the individual spins are highly
correlated, regardless of the overall ambiguity in the direction.
The correlation are exposed by asking “conditional probability” questions.
Given that the spin is “up” in one corner of the magnet, one can predict that
elsewhere the spins are highly likely to be pointing in the same direction. In
this way one can designate certain observation to be used as “conditions”
(e.g. the magnetization in the corner) and check the remaining observations
(the remaining spin directions) against the predictions.
In the end, physics is about “sacrificing” the minimum number of observa-
tions for use as conditions, and using these conditions to make the maximum
number of predictions.
I would like to advocate that the field of cosmology take this perspective
more seriously. What are the minimum set of cosmological observations
we should use as “ conditions” in order to maximize our predictive power?
I believe that the only guiding principle in this process is that minimum
number of conditions should be used to maximum effect. Questions which
can not be resolved even when all the observations are used as conditions
must be classified as metaphysical questions.
Most cosmologists strongly dislike “anthropic” arguments which seem to
be willing to use too many observations as conditions, and make too few
predictions. Our job is certainly to get as far away from that limit as
possible. It is worth remembering, however, that quantum mechanics ensures
that the generic predictions will take the form of a probability distribution
rather than a single point in classical phase space, so (as in the ferromagnet
example) more conditions are required to produce concrete predictions.
It is particularly interesting to consider the implications of the discussion
in Sect. 2 in this context. If quantum cosmology provides us with a range
of possible effective dynamics, are the laws of physics at, say, the GUT scale
simply a question of metaphysics? Might different domains with different
effective GUT theories contribute to the physical processes we observe to-
day? In Sect. 4 I explore the implications of this question on inflationary
cosmologies.
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3.2 The “Classical” Condition
Before considering inflation, I wish to point to a possibly interesting “condi-
tion” at our disposal. Since the invention of quantum mechanics there has
been a lot of concern focused on the extent to which classical behavior can
emerge in quantum systems in the appropriate cases. Particular attention
has been given to the “quantum measurement problem”.
I am convinced that as long as the measurement apparatus is included
in the Hilbert space, and one solves the Schro¨dinger equation for the whole
works, there is no quantum measurement problem[7]. Even those who oppose
this view would agree that the Schro¨dinger evolution of a realistic apparatus
has very special behavior which does not reflect the properties of generic
quantum systems. Given this fact, it can seem rather amazing that we are
accustomed to viewing this fundamentally quantum world in such a classical
manner.
It might be interesting to turn this question around, and let the classical-
ity of the universe we observe be one of the conditions we use in cosmology
(for a related line of thinking see [8]). Certainly very special initial conditions
and special dynamics are required to give classical behavior. For example,
one key feature required for classical behavior is a very clear statistical arrow
of time[7]. This has its roots in the very low entropy nature of our initial
conditions.
It is worth noting that, as emphasized by Penrose[9], the sense in which
the early universe had low entropy is the sense in which the spacetime was
very simple. It is these conditions which inflation is so good at producing,
and indeed inflation could well be the best way of producing low entropy
initial conditions. Since classical behavior seems to be so atypical of ran-
domly chosen quantum systems, the “classical condition” may prove to be
a very powerful one. It could (via the arrow of time requirement) end up
“predicting” inflation, for example.
4 Implications for Inflation
Many different effective GUT scale theories could account for our obser-
vations of the physical world. If quantum cosmology actually forces us to
consider a range of high energy physics models as equally realistic alterna-
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tives (as I argued in Sect. 2) then the implications for inflation could be very
interesting 2.
If one asks which inflaton potentials contribute the highest probability to
finding a universe with whatever feature we choose to use as “conditions”,
what type of inflaton potentials are selected out? It is quite possible that this
perspective gives quite a different notion of what is “natural” or “unnatural”
about inflaton potentials. In particular, if a certain inflaton potential has
an unusual functional form, but contributes much more than average to the
“acceptable” regions of the universe then there is a sense in which this is a
more “typical” inflaton potential.
4.1 An Interesting Possibility
In an inflationary model the form of the inflaton potential determines both
the duration of inflation and the spectrum and amplitude of the perturbations
which emerge at the end. One of the least attractive features of inflation is
that there is no clear choice for the form of the inflaton potential[11, 12].
Furthermore, all of the many candidates look extremely artificial from a
particle physics point of view. The less artificial versions give unacceptable
predictions (such as density fluctuations so large as to destroy all the benefits
of having inflation in the first place).
Given that all predictions from inflation depend on this completely un-
known inflaton potential, the theory has essentially no predictive power. Peo-
ple try to save inflation from this fate by arguing that some inflaton potentials
are more “natural” or “generic”. The problem is that by the same criteria
the most generic potentials give unacceptably larger perturbations.
How might the perspective presented in this article change things? The
issues I have raised here may lead to a very different notion of “typical infla-
ton potential”. In my view, the most attractive possible outcome would be
if inflaton potentials giving perturbations with arbitrarily small amplitudes
were to make the dominant contributions (it may be these, for example,
which produce the most volume of inflated regions). In this way, any specific
details of the potential would be irrelevant, and the observational predictions
of inflation would be simple and unique: A perfectly flat, homogeneous, and
2Mezhlumian and Linde give an excellent modern review of the status inflation with
some interesting connections to the issues raised here. [10].
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isotropic universe. Such inflaton potentials would certainly not be “generic”
by conventional criteria, but my point is that the conventional criteria may
be the wrong criteria.
The perturbations we observe can then be generated by topological de-
fects. This picture would provide a simple explanation for why the spacetime
took a specific (unperturbed) form before the defects formed. The lack of
such an explanation is the greatest weakness of the standard defect scenar-
ios. The usual attempts to combine defect scenarios with an earlier period
of inflation look even more ungainly than the standard inflationary picture.
4.2 Realistic Assessment
How realistic is the “zero perturbation” inflationary scenario which I have
just described? The simplest chaotic inflaton potentials (say λφ4) do produce
more expansion (more total volume) as the potential is tuned to give smaller
amplitude perturbations. However, in that limit the matter density of the
universe at the end of inflation is zero. Clearly any reasonable “conditions”
will exclude this possibility. An attractive condition is that there is net
baryon number. In models where this can only be generated at the GUT
scale there will then be reheating to temperatures high enough to produce
interesting defects. (In the very simplest models this may also correspond to
non-negligible perturbations from inflation, however.)
Allowing the inflaton potential to take on other than the simplest forms
may actually decouple the amplitude of the perturbations from the total
volume of the inflated region. It may well turn out that these arguments
encounter the same measure problems which appear in the standard discus-
sions of inflation (what is the right measure to place on the space of inflaton
potentials?)
It is also possible that the measure problem can be resolved, but the
predictions simply do not coincide with the “zero perturbation” case I am
advocating. Another interesting possibility is that the most sensible “condi-
tions” may end up causing inflation to predict something really strange, like
Ω 6= 1 [10].
My conclusion, at this stage, is that these are an interesting set of ideas
which require further investigation before anything concrete can be built out
of them.
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5 Conclusions
Does it make any sense to discuss an absolutely fundamental TOE? I have
suggested that even if one could construct such a theory, the observations we
make are so superficial that the TOE might not constrain these observations
in a very substantial way. In the limit where there is no constraint, a TOE
becomes, from our perspective, a “Theory of Anything”.
With so much room for ambiguity, one must be absolutely clear about
the boundary between physics and metaphysics. One important tool in this
effort is the posing of carefully stated conditional probability questions. We
must state very carefully what we are conditioning on and what are we trying
to predict. I have argued that the “classicality” condition may prove to be a
very powerful one.
The zero-perturbation inflationary scenario which I have advocated here
seems to suggest an elegant boundary between metaphysics and physics. In
this scenario the ugly aspects of inflation (the details of the inflaton poten-
tial) are relegated to metaphysics, because the specific form of the spectrum
of perturbations is unobservable. Whether this attractive scenario can be
realized remains to be seen.
A clearer appreciation of the boundary between physics and metaphysics
may prove very sobering for the field of cosmology. I will end, therefore, with
an optimistic note: The field of cosmology has a grand history of pushing
back the boundary between physics and metaphysics. Decades ago, who
would have thought that the origin of relative abundances of the different
chemical elements would be considered the subject of physical calculation
rather than metaphysical speculation! I have no doubt that we will find
more opportunities to push the boundary back even further.
I would like to thank Franco Occhionero for organizing a stimulating
workshop, and I thank Neil Turok and Robert Brandenberger for useful con-
versations. I am also grateful for the hospitality of the Isaac Newton Institute
where this manuscript was written.
After the workshop, a very interesting preprint appeared by A. Vilenkin
which has considerable overlap with the ideas presented here[13]. I thank A.
Vilenkin for discussions of his work.
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